Beyond Rivalry: Central Asia’s Quest for Sovereignty in the Critical Minerals Choice

Abstract

The global energy transition has intensified geopolitical competition for critical minerals, placing Central Asia at the center of this emerging strategic landscape. Yet the Western investment model—presented as transparent and sustainable—often conceals underappreciated risks, including geopolitical instrumentalization, economic volatility, and a persistent gap between rhetoric and implementation. Questions remain over whether Western engagement in the region has become overly tactical, driven more by rivalry with China than by long-term development objectives. By contrast, China and Russia, despite their governance dilemmas, advance integrated packages linking mining technology, infrastructure, and financing, with potential benefits and risks alike. This article argues that the origin of capital matters less than the negotiating power of Central Asian states. Sustainable development will not result from choosing sides but from leveraging great-power competition to demand technology transfer, value-added processing, and binding environmental safeguards on terms defined in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Ashgabat, and Dushanbe—not in Washington, Brussels, Moscow or Beijing.

Introduction: A New Resource Race

The escalating competition between the United States and China over semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and green technologies has transformed critical minerals into a key pillar of global economic and security strategy. Washington’s CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 imposed sweeping restrictions on advanced chip exports and incentivized domestic semiconductor manufacturing, framing technological leadership as a national security imperative.[1] Beijing responded in July 2023 by introducing export licensing requirements for gallium and germanium—metals indispensable to semiconductor and defense industries—explicitly linking the measures to Western technology curbs.[2] These tit-for-tat actions signaled that critical minerals now lie at the center of industrial policy, security planning, and great-power rivalry.

This contest extends beyond microchips. China’s dominance in electric vehicle batteries, rare earth processing, and solar panel manufacturing, achieved through decades of industrial policy and subsidies, has triggered growing concern in Washington and Brussels over strategic dependence.[3] Western governments have responded with protectionist incentives under the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, aiming to localize supply chains for clean energy technologies and reduce vulnerability to Chinese leverage.[4]

The war in Ukraine has accelerated these dynamics, exposing Western militaries’ reliance on fragile mineral supply chains. NATO members, seeking to replenish depleted stockpiles of precision weapons and advanced equipment, have acknowledged that secure access to lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and other inputs is now as essential for defense production as for the green transition.[5] In December 2024, NATO for the first time designated twelve “defense-critical” raw materials as vital to Allied security, with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warning against repeating Europe’s earlier overdependence on Russian energy supplies.[6]

Amid this geopolitical competition, Central Asia has re-emerged as a strategic arena. The region’s vast reserves of uranium, copper, rare earths, and other critical minerals have drawn competing offers: the United States and European Union emphasize “transparent and sustainable” investment frameworks, while China and Russia promote integrated packages combining resource access with infrastructure, technology transfer, and long-term supply contracts.[7] Analysts note that while “Washington talks, Beijing acts,” rapidly expanding its foothold in Central Asia’s resource sector.[8] Beneath this rhetoric, however, lies a more complex reality: Western engagement, despite its language of governance and responsibility, often delivers fragmented projects with limited industrial spillovers, while China’s approach, though technologically sophisticated, raises concerns about debt dependency, governance standards, and environmental safeguards.[9] For Central Asia, the real challenge is therefore not choosing between rival powers but securing the negotiating power to transform mineral wealth into long-term development on its own terms.

Structural Realities: State Capacity and Resource Control

Central Asia is far from uniform in how it manages its mineral wealth. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan dominate the sector through powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like Kazatomprom, Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Combine (NMMC), and Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (AMMC), which control everything from extraction to processing. These vertically integrated giants allow governments to negotiate with foreign partners from a position of strength, demanding technology transfer and downstream investment as conditions for access.

Kazakhstan represents the region’s clearest example of SOE-anchored leverage. Alongside mature uranium JVs with Cameco and Orano, Astana pushes critical-minerals exploration and processing through Kazatomprom, Tau-Ken Samruk, and Qazgeology with carefully curated foreign partners.[10] Strong institutions give Kazakhstan bargaining power—yet turning memoranda and intent into plants and patents still depends on contractual teeth and credible timelines.

Uzbekistan similarly concentrates mineral development on its core SOEs and is pushing aggressively into midstream processing. Traditionally, two large state combines (NMMC) and AMMC) – controlled gold, uranium, and base/rare metals. Since 2024, Uzbekistan has created a new holding the Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex (UzTMC) under AMMC to integrate the entire critical minerals value chain. UzTMK now manages all state critical is moving toward-mineral assets (lithium, REEs, etc.).[11] The signal is clear: access deals are expected to culminate in on-shore separation, conversion, and specialty products, not raw-ore exports.

Tajikistan sits between the SOE-heavy models of Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s more fragmented landscape. The state channels large projects through Tajikistan Aluminum Company (TALCO)-anchored vehicles (e.g., TALCO Gold), giving Dushanbe leverage over tungsten (Maykhura deposit) and antimony (Konchoch deposit) while relying on partner capital and technology. Some projects outside these arrangements (e.g., the Anzob antimony deposit) signal a more mixed ownership structure.[12] The constraint is midstream depth: separation, chemical conversion, and finishing remain limited in-country, so agreements must hard-code on-shore processing, technology transfer, and auditable environmental/tailings obligations to avoid a mine-and-ship equilibrium.

Kyrgyzstan sits at the other end of the spectrum, still consolidating institutional capacity. The sector has long been marked by fragmented, foreign-led projects that proved vulnerable to political shocks; controversies around Kumtor and the 2019 uranium moratorium at Kyzyl-Ompol showed how quickly disputes can trigger heavy intervention or even nationalization, with high fiscal and reputational costs.[13] Following the 2020–21 political transition, an early attempt to centralize state stakes—the national holding “Heritage of Great Nomads”—was founded in late 2021 but discontinued in early 2023, with officials deeming its continued operation “inappropriate” after changes in asset management.[14] Policy is now turning to clearer coordination and midstream-oriented governance, with a national Critical Minerals Strategy under development.[15]

Turkmenistan still plays a limited role in regional critical-minerals, though potash is gaining policy salience amid food-security concerns and Western “critical raw material” discussions.[16] The country also has lithium-bearing brines and rare-earth-bearing phosphorites, but these resources remain largely unexplored.[17] Given a state-led model and a challenging investment climate, Western participation may remain constrained without transparent regulatory frameworks, reliable logistics, and bankable offtake guarantees.[18]

These institutional asymmetries shape how outside capital actually lands. Where SOEs steward the agenda (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan), foreign partners tend to arrive through joint ventures and pilot processing; where capacity is thinner (Kyrgyzstan), exposure to junior-led projects and policy whiplash is greater; Tajikistan sits between these poles, and Turkmenistan still largely remains off the critical-minerals map except for potash. Against this backdrop, the key question is not who knocks on the door, but whether the deals they sign hard-wire midstream, technology transfer, and enforceable safeguards. That is the test Western engagement keeps failing.

Western Engagement: Tactical Moves, Strategic Absences

Despite high-profile dialogues and MOUs, Western participation on the ground has often been fragmented and litigation-prone, with limited mid-stream investment. In practice, procedural ESG and access-seeking tend to outrun industrial upgrading, and—absent binding local-value obligations—Western engagement risks reproducing low-value extractivism.

Kumtor and the Limits of the Western Investment Model

Kyrgyzstan’s Kumtor mine, operated for decades by Canada’s Centerra Gold, stands as the most consequential illustration of rhetoric diverging from reality. Initially presented as a model foreign investment, Kumtor soon became synonymous with environmental harm, social conflict, and political confrontation. The 1998 Barskoon cyanide spill contaminated local waterways and poisoned residents; medical and legal disputes dragged on for years.[19]
In 2021, a Kyrgyz court fined the operator for dumping waste rock on glaciers, highlighting the gap between compliance rhetoric and on-site practice—a fine, however, that was never enforced and was annulled by a higher court in May 2022 as part of the final settlement. Because the Davidov and Lysyi glaciers at Kumtor feed the Naryn River—the main source of the Syr Darya sustaining agriculture, hydropower, and drinking water across Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan—such degradation carried transboundary consequences and arguably met emerging legal criteria for ecocide.[20] Kyrgyz authorities explicitly invoked these environmental and water-security risks when defending the May 2021 state intervention, framing nationalization not merely as a sovereignty move but as a response to mounting ecological and regional security concerns.[21] As President Sadyr Japarov explained at the time, “We introduced external management because they used natural resources not according to international standards and did not pay taxes in full”, linking environmental damage, fiscal grievances, and questions of strategic control in one sweeping justification.[22]

In May 2021, the government placed the mine under external management; by April 2022, a global settlement transferred full control to Kyrgyzaltyn and ended multi-jurisdictional litigation.[23] The case ultimately shows that values-laden branding does not guarantee best practice: without contractually enforceable environmental safeguards, transparent fiscal terms, and technology transfer, the Western investment model delivered volatility rather than durable development.

Kyzyl-Ompol: social license, state trust-building, and a visionary frame (Kyrgyzstan)

Kyrgyzstan’s uranium sector epitomizes the fragility of Western junior-miner engagement in Central Asia, where tactical access-seeking collides with volatile social license and regulatory uncertainty. The Kyzyl-Ompol uranium cluster—developed initially by Canada’s Azarga Uranium (via UrAsia in Kyrgyzstan LLC) – triggered rapid social mobilization in 2019, culminating in a nationwide moratorium on uranium and thorium mining.[24] The backlash was less a critique of specific project safeguards than a fear-driven reaction rooted in Soviet-era legacies, which bypassed dialogue and erased years of preparation and investor capital. Azarga’s exit—selling its stake for a modest consideration while retaining a small, hard-to-enforce royalty – spotlights a litigation-prone, low-value junior model.[25]

In June 2024 President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov signed the Law «On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts (the Code of Offences, the Law «On Subsoil») and invalidating the Law «On Prohibition of Activities Related to the Geological Survey of Subsoil for the Purpose of Search, Exploration and Development of Uranium, Thorium Deposits in the Kyrgyz Republic.[26] This was not a simple lifting of the ban but a clear-cut policy reset. Following month, the state-owned Kyrgyzaltyn—the country’s largest mining enterprise—was granted the rights to use the Kyzyl-Ompol subsoil, consolidating public control over project sequencing and standards.[27]

Authorities emphasized balancing ecological safeguards with strategic resource use and publicly framed the deposit’s multi-metal profile—uranium, thorium, and titanomagnetite—as a basis for staged, risk-managed development. President Sadyr Japarov personally engaged local communities —calling to avoid politicization, answering questions in open formats, and stressing there were “no reasons for alarm” provided rigorous standards are enforced—steps designed to rebuild trust after the 2019 rupture.[28] The government commissioned an inventory and valuation exercise, which produced a preliminary estimate of reserve values at $60–90 billion with a positive outlook for revision, and shifted the near-term industrial focus toward titanomagnetite, while treating uranium as a secondary, tightly controlled resource stream.[29] Importantly, authorities have repeatedly signaled openness to financing from a range of international partners, framing Kyzyl-Ompol as a candidate for diversified, transparent capital and stable investment structures that hard-code local processing, technology transfer, and enforceable environmental standards—rather than a single-sponsor, extraction-first model.

Crucially, Bishkek is articulating a visionary frame for Kyzyl-Ompol where President Zhaparov voiced (i) thorium as a strategic option linked to future technologies (reactor/materials technologies); (ii) intergenerational benefits via state dividends/fiscal mechanisms; and (iii) sequenced access to sensitive ores conditioned on local processing, technology transfer, and enforceable environmental standards.[30] In September 2024, then-Prime Minister Akylbek Japarov added that the project would progress from initial titanomagnetite concentrate exports to domestic production of sponge titanium, capturing far higher value within Kyrgyzstan’s economy.[31] Supporting this trajectory, after years of neglect the Kara-Balta Mining Plant—declared bankrupt in 2022—was transferred to Kyrgyzaltyn’s full control and is being now revived as a strategic processing hub that will require substantial modernization investment.[32]

The case reveals a pattern: Western firms secured acreage but failed to anchor social consent or mid-stream value, leaving the state to remediate disputes and restructure development on a longer-horizon, technology-led basis.

Kutessay II: Bakiyev-era licensing, arbitration hangover, and a state-led revival (Kyrgyzstan)

Once the backbone of Soviet rare-earth supply, Kutessay-II ranked among the USSR’s largest REE sources—at times providing about 80% of specific elements such as yttrium.[33] The license for deposit in the Aktuz (Kemin) field (with heavy-REE potential and associated polymetallics) was transferred in December 2009 to Stans Energy (due to aquistion of Kutisay Mining LLC) during the final months of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. After the April 2010 revolution, the new authorities folded the project into a broader review of Bakiyev-era awards amid allegations that a strategic asset had been underpriced and obtained through a non-transparent process; Kutessay II quickly became emblematic of end-of-cycle opacity.[34] Between 2012 and 2014, regulators and prosecutors suspended and then revoked rights at the site, which pushed the dispute into multi-track arbitration: an early Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI) proceeding produced a default award later set aside by Russian courts, and a subsequent Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) case ended in August 2019 with a finding of unlawful expropriation but an award of 15 million USD in damages (plus interest and partial costs) – a fraction of the hundreds of millions claimed.[35] The award was later recognized by a U.S. court, while enforcement efforts in Canada against Kyrgyzaltyn-linked assets failed, leaving the investor without recovery on those targets.[36] Meanwhile, the Kyrgyz authorities maintain that the rights to the deposits were obtained by the claimants through bribery of officials and the subsequent laundering of the bribe funds via offshore accounts.[37] The outcome was stark: years wasted, no restart, no domestic value-added—litigation eclipsed development, and the case is routinely invoked as a cautionary example when characterizing Kyrgyzstan’s investment climate.

By 2023, the site remained unreclaimed, underscoring the need to hard-code environmental rehabilitation and processing commitments into future agreements. With proposals to allocate part of the 700 million EUR eurobond proceeds to projects such as Kutessay-II and Kyzyl-Ompol, investment frameworks are facing growing demands for transparency and enforceable outcomes.[38] Since 2024–2025, policy has shifted from dispute management to active stewardship: the Cabinet — with senior officials, including the Prime Minister, inspecting quarries and tailings in the Chuy region — has carried out multiple site visits, launched comprehensive inventories, and mandated Kyrgyzgeology to advance Kutessay-II alongside Kalesai (beryllium) and to survey the Aktuz tailings for recoverable value, signaling that any restart would be contingent on strict environmental safeguards, meaningful community engagement, and transparent public supervision, while integrating the REE cluster into a coherent state program rather than leaving it to ad-hoc licensing.[39] The policy lesson mirrors Kyzyl-Ompol: opaque, end-of-cycle licensing produced a decade of arbitration and no industrial upgrading; the corrective now is state-led consolidation and a processing-first revival mandate that hard-codes local processing, technology transfer, and enforceable ESG into any partnership—foreign or domestic.

Tajikistan — “defense-grade” pitch, dual-use sensitivities, thin downstreams

Western investors and mining operators increasingly present Tajikistan’s projects to policy and defense audiences as non-Chinese, “defense-relevant” supply sources. This external narrative, largely driven by Western lobbying circles rather than by Dushanbe itself, frames projects through security lenses to justify financing, access, and strategic attention — even when ESG standards, local value-add, and community safeguards remain secondary concerns. The Maykhura tungsten mine (GB Innovation–Pure Tungsten with Tajik Aluminium Company, TALCO) advertises ~1,400 t/year of concentrate and links demand to defense stockpile replenishment amid simultaneous high-intensity conflicts in Ukraine and Israel.[40] This frame is supported by the REEShore Act (2022) proposal, which steers U.S. defense supply chains away from China and, alongside tungsten, also identifies antimony as a “covered critical mineral.”[41]

However, as in Kyrgyzstan’s cases above, the real structural problem is thin downstreams: most projects stop at raw concentrate exports, with minimal on-shore refining or chemical conversion. The result is an externally imposed “strategic” narrative sitting atop weak midstream capacity and limited contractual obligations for technology transfer, ESG compliance, or local value creation.

Antimony is a critical material in the defense-industrial supply chain, essential for manufacturing armor-piercing ammunition, explosives, nuclear weapons components, and various other military technologies, including night-vision systems.[42] According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), Tajikistan ranked second globally in antimony production in 2023 with about 17,000 tonnes (approx. 16–17 % of world output), and Eurostat data show Tajikistan supplied ≈ 54 % of the European Union’s antimony imports in 2023.[43]

Much of this originates from the Anzob Mining and Beneficiation Complex, located in the Ayni district of Tajikistan’s Sughd Region, a major facility extracting and processing antimony and mercury ores from the Dzhizhikrut deposit. Entirely owned by the U.S.-based Comsup Commodities Inc., the complex has undergone substantial modernization with US$300 million invested over 15 years to expand production capacity.[44] It has become a flagship of U.S. critical-minerals investment in Central Asia and demonstrates its rising importance as a potential supplier to the United States, especially as Washington seeks to diversify away from Chinese dependence.

A similar pattern emerges at the Takob Mine (fluorspar and lead ore), where development by Vast Resources plc (United Kingdom) combines plant upgrades, services, and an approximately 12.25% royalty, while TALCO retains operational control and offtake into its chemicals chain.[45] Fluorspar has some indirect defense relevance, given that hydrofluoric acid derived from it underpins parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, high-performance polymers, and specialty optics. Moreover, fluorspar is included in the United States’ Critical Minerals List (2022). Lead, while historically central for ammunition and shielding, played a lesser strategic role in recent policy designations: it was not on the finalized U.S. list in 2022 but appears in the 2025 draft, reflecting growing concern over supply chain vulnerabilities.[46]

Yet this defense framing is politically delicate for Dushanbe: Tajikistan’s SCO or CSTO ties make open “defense-grade” branding risky, even if the commercial logic is obvious. To manage this, the government increasingly shall insist on binding agreements that require on-shore processing, technology transfer, workforce training, and strict ESG compliance. These mechanisms could balance defense-linked marketing with domestic value creation and help limit political risk.

Kazakhstan — “Access-First” Optics, 75/25 Controversies, and the Downstream Test

Western investors increasingly present Kazakhstan’s critical-minerals projects as non-Chinese, ESG-aligned supply sources for the global energy transition. The Cove Capital–Qazgeology joint venture (JV) on the Akbulak rare-earth project illustrates this framing: signed in 2025 with Cove holding seventy-five percent and Qazgeology twenty-five percent, the agreement grants the Western partner majority control at the exploration stage while anchoring the project in a national institution that manages licensing and geological data.[47] Importantly, Cove is not a marginal player. It is simultaneously engaged in critical-minerals ventures inside the United States and has positioned itself within Washington’s policy and legislative debates on diversifying supply chains away from China. Through its portfolio companies and advisory links, Cove contributes to U.S. discussions on rare earth security, recycling technologies, and domestic processing capacity — making it one of the few actors connecting on-the-ground projects with strategic policymaking in the United States and Central Asia.[48]

The announcement triggered strong reactions — emotional as well as instrumental — from bloggers and policy commentators. Many portrayed the seventy-five to twenty-five split as a “sellout” of Kazakhstan’s strategic minerals or even as a new form of colonialism, warning or even “scaring” that high foreign equity stakes risk locking the country into a raw-ore export model with little local value creation.[49] Critics argued that Western investors gain strategic acreage and ESG branding while Kazakhstan assumes long-term environmental and political risks, with no guaranteed commitments to on-shore processing, refining, or technology transfer. Others linked the debate to broader resource-nationalism concerns, suggesting that without binding obligations the venture could reproduce a familiar pattern where the language of sustainability masks the absence of industrial depth or domestic spillovers.

Yet this reading misses the basic logic of junior-led mining ventures. At the exploration stage, where geological and commercial risks remain high and most concessions never reach production, it is standard practice globally for the private investor to finance the entire early-phase cost in exchange for majority equity. In Kazakhstan, as in other resource states, the state often retains a carried interest — here twenty-five percent — with the option to increase its stake once proven reserves, feasibility studies, and commercial viability trigger a new round of contractual negotiations. The seventy-five to twenty-five optics therefore reflect provisional financing risk rather than permanent control over Kazakhstan’s rare earths, a structure designed to attract early capital while preserving long-term strategic flexibility.

The deeper structural issue lies not in the equity ratio itself but in the absence of hard-coded downstream obligations. Like many Western critical-mineral ventures, the Akbulak project currently prioritizes acreage access, exploration rights, and geopolitical signaling — a “non-Chinese supply chain” narrative — while deferring commitments on domestic refining, chemical conversion, or value-added manufacturing. Cove has publicly stated its “ambition to fully integrated mine-to-magnet supply chain which will benefit Kazakhstan” and although this vision is promising, it remains unclear whether it will be translated into dated, financed, and contractually enforceable commitments for on-shore processing, technology transfer, or manufacturing capacity. Until such provisions are hard-wired into future agreements, the risk persists that Kazakhstan will again supply raw materials into external value chains without building its own industrial base.

As in other cases across Central Asia, the solution is contractual rather than rhetorical. Exploration-heavy, access-first models must evolve into binding partnerships that link resource extraction to domestic industrialization, environmental safeguards, and workforce development. Whether the Cove–Qazgeology joint venture follows this path will determine if early foreign majority stakes become stepping stones toward balanced strategic cooperation or remain symbols of asymmetry in Kazakhstan’s critical-minerals sector.

Critical Minerals and Technology Access: Western Hesitation and On-the-Ground Technological Choices

The “criticality” of critical minerals in Central Asia must be understood as context-dependent: for regional states, it represents an opportunity to upgrade their economies — but only if foreign investment brings not just capital but also technology transfer, value-added processing, and environmental and social governance (ESG) safeguards.[50] Yet a persistent challenge is whether Western partners are prepared to move beyond rhetorical ESG commitments and provide Central Asia with access to frontier technologies, or whether they will instead replicate a familiar pattern of selective access and technological gatekeeping.

The controversy surrounding the 2025 AI Diffusion Export Controls, which introduced a global tier system restricting advanced AI chips and model weights for entire groups of countries, illustrates this dilemma vividly. Central Asian states were placed in the “Tier 2” category — neither fully trusted partners nor adversaries — facing licensing hurdles, performance caps, and bureaucratic delays, while Tier 1 allies enjoyed near-unrestricted access.[51] This regulatory framing reinforced perceptions that Western technology regimes remain hierarchical, politically selective, and risk turning Central Asia into a technological periphery with limited sovereignty over its digital and industrial future.

By contrast, China increasingly positions itself as the region’s partner in technological modernization. Its role has become increasingly evident in recent years with the rapid deployment of electric vehicles (EVs) across Central Asian cities, coupled with investments in charging infrastructure and the emergence of regional EV supply chains, including manufacturing capacity.^[52] This illustrates China’s willingness to couple resource extraction with technological integration, offering access to green and digital transitions rather than maintaining strict hierarchies of technological access.

In parallel, a second “already on the ground” domain is scaling: nuclear energy. The same comprehensive approach now moves beyond electric mobility into nuclear power, where projects combine energy generation with industrial development, skills transfer, and technological modernization. China and Russia have been long-standing partners in the uranium sector across Central Asia and are now taking the lead in the region’s nuclear energy development. Russia is advancing the first nuclear power plant projects in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, promoting both state-of-the-art modular reactors and VVER-1200 units.[53] Rosatom’s integrated concession model combines EPC reactor delivery with lifecycle fuel services, grid modernization, training, and operations & maintenance, turning nuclear partnerships into industrial platforms rather than mere energy projects.[54] Beyond energy, Rosatom is also involved in environmental remediation of legacy uranium mines and initiatives such as the nuclear medicine center in Kyrgyzstan, broadening its role as a long-term strategic partner for regional governments.[55]

At the same time, China is engaging in the construction of nuclear power plants across Central Asia and, building on its uranium investments, could in the future introduce state-of-the-art modular molten-salt reactors using thorium technology along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) corridors, tapping the region’s thorium reserves.[56] Together, Moscow and Beijing now anchor a regional shift toward energy–industrial integration, linking nuclear energy not only to power supply but also to industrialization, environmental management, and technological sovereignty — an offer that Western actors have so far been unable or unwilling to match.

Looking ahead, mining-process technologies show where the next wave of leadership could emerge — and where catching up will be most difficult. China remains the undisputed technological leader in critical minerals mining and processing. Chinese firms have pioneered electric field–based rare earth extraction methods (electrokinetic mining, or EKM) methods that achieve up to 95% recovery rates, cut mining time by 70%, and reduce ammonia emissions by 95%.[57] This offers a far more environmentally sustainable alternative to the ammonium-salt-based techniques previously responsible for severe ecological damage.[58]

One instructive case is Indonesia’s nickel sector, where Chinese investment—catalyzed by the 2020 ore-export ban—combined extraction with local smelting, midstream processing, and supporting infrastructure. The experience shows that determined policy can unlock downstream capacity and greater domestic value, but with real trade-offs like environmental burdens.[59] For Central Asia, the lesson is not a blueprint to copy but leverage to negotiate integrated packages on their own terms—binding technology transfer, on-shore processing, and auditable safeguards. China has shown it can move quickly to finance such integrated offers, while many Western actors have proceeded more cautiously, often limiting technology transfer even as they seek resource access.

Taken together, these dynamics illustrate a deeper transformation underway in Central Asia’s development model. From critical minerals and green technologies to nuclear energy and industrial platforms, China and Russia position themselves as providers of integrated technological ecosystems rather than fragmented, arms-length projects. The Western approach, by contrast, risks reinforcing the perception of selective access and technological gatekeeping, offering standards and ESG narratives without comparable commitments to industrial upgrading, technological sovereignty, or regional integration. As Central Asia seeks to move beyond raw resource exports toward value-added processing, clean energy, and digital-industrial modernization, the choice of partners — and the models they bring — will increasingly shape the region’s economic trajectory and geopolitical alignments for decades to come.

From Extraction to Empowerment: The Pillars of Negotiating Power

The cumulative lesson from Western stumbles and Chinese advancements is that investor origin is a secondary concern. The primary determinant of success is the strategic coherence and bargaining power of the Central Asian state itself. Reactive resource nationalism—focused solely on tax grabs or export bans—proves futile unless it is underpinned by a forward-looking industrial strategy. The path to sustainable development is built on three non-negotiable pillars, which must be hard-coded into every agreement:

• Domestic Value Capture: Contracts must transcend mere extraction. They must be legally binding instruments that mandate the phased development of on-shore processing facilities, substantive technology transfer, and advanced workforce training programs. The goal is to transform raw ore into finished components, moving up the value chain from supplier to producer.
• Enforceable Environmental and Social Governance: Voluntary ESG principles are a public relations tool; they are not a governance framework. Terms must include independently auditable environmental safeguards, fully funded rehabilitation plans, and mechanisms for genuine community participation and benefit-sharing. This is not just ethical but strategic, as the cases of Kumtor and Kyzyl-Ompol prove; neglecting it is the fastest way to derail a project.
• Revenue-Linked Diversification: Mineral wealth must be leveraged to build the economy beyond mining. Sovereign wealth funds, R&D investments in material science, and support for downstream manufacturing are essential to inoculate the economy against commodity price shocks and create a post-mining economic future.

The global playbook is clear: Indonesia’s success in commanding nickel processing and Chile’s management of its copper wealth demonstrate that value is captured at the negotiating table, not just in the mine. Central Asia’s task is to apply these lessons with even greater rigor, using the leverage of its resources to demand terms that serve its own long-term vision.

Conclusion: Defining the Terms of Engagement

The great-power scramble for Central Asia’s critical minerals is a symptom of a broader global fragmentation. For Washington and Brussels, the region is a tactical arena in a struggle to reduce dependence on China. For Beijing, it is a crucial resource hinterland and a proving ground for its integrated investment model. For Moscow, it is a sphere of influence to be maintained. But for the capitals of Central Asia, this competition is not a geopolitical endgame; it is a strategic opportunity.

This moment, however, offers no guarantees. Mineral wealth has historically been a curse as often as a blessing. The definitive choice facing the region is not a binary one between East and West—a framework that inherently cedes agency to external powers. The true choice is between two futures: one of passive extraction, where the region remains a supplier of raw materials and a battleground for external influence, and one of active transformation, where it becomes an architect of its own destiny.

The blueprint for the latter path is now clear. It requires the institutional strength to negotiate not for access fees, but for industrial partnerships. It demands the contractual ingenuity to bind partners—irrespective of their origin—to commitments in technology, processing, and environmental stewardship. The rivalry between powers creates the leverage; it is up to Central Asian governments to use it.

Ultimately, the quest for critical minerals will reveal a fundamental truth: whether the resources beneath the earth become a foundation for lasting sovereignty or yet another chapter in dependency will be decided not in Washington, Beijing, or Moscow, but in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat. The power to define a third path—one of assertive neutrality and industrial ambition—rests firmly in their hands.

Przemyslaw Ozierski – Expert at the Central Asia Strategic Center for Analysis, Dialogue and Development (CASCADD) (Kyrgyzstan)

ENDNOTES

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[1]  U.S. Congress. “CHIPS and Science Act of 2022.” Public Law 117-167, August 9, 2022. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346

[2] Reuters. China Imposes Export Controls on Gallium and Germanium. London: Reuters, 2023. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-impose-export-controls-gallium-germanium-tech-metals-2023-07-03/

[3] Bloomberg. China’s Electric Vehicle Dominance Prompts U.S., Europe to Respond. New York: Bloomberg, 2024. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-15/china-s-electric-vehicle-dominance-prompts-us-europe-to-respond

[4] European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials Act,” Single Market Economy, accessed September 16, 2025, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.

Sam Barr. “Protectionism Is Back – But Not as You Know It: How the US Inflation Reduction Act Is Reshaping the Path to a Green Energy Transition.” Wilson Center, October 13, 2023. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/protectionism-back-not-you-know-it-how-us-inflation-reduction-act-reshaping-path-green

[5] Gregory Wischer, “The U.S. Military and NATO Face Serious Risks of Mineral Shortages,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2024. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/the-us-military-and-nato-face-serious-risks-of-mineral-shortages?lang=en

[6] “NATO releases list of 12 defence-critical raw materials.” NATO, December 11, 2024. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_231765.htm
“The Geopolitics of Dependence: NATO, China, and Critical Raw Materials.” Beyond the Horizon, Accessed September 16, 2025. Available at: https://behorizon.org/the-geopolitics-of-dependence-nato-china-and-critical-raw-materials/

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[12] Lee, Sunjin, and Chul-Ho Heo. “An Overview of Mineral Resources in Tajikistan.” Journal of the Korean Society of Economic and Environmental Geology, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2025): 217–229. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.9719/EEG.2025.58.3.217

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GBI Innovation begins development of Tajikistan’s ‘Maykhura Mine’ — agreement with TALCO. Asia Economic Daily / KoreaScience, 2024. Available at: https://www.koreascience.kr/article/JAKO202519632402663.pdf

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[13] Reuters. “Kyrgyzstan bans uranium mining after protests.” May 2, 2019. Accessed 2025-09-16. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/kyrgyzstan-bans-uranium-mining-after-protests-idUSKCN1S81NM/

[14] 24.KG. “New holding company Heritage of Great Nomads established in Kyrgyzstan.” Accessed 2025-09-16. Available at: https://24.kg/english/217090__New_holding_company_Heritage_of_Great_Nomads_established_in_Kyrgyzstan/;

24.KG. “Heritage of Great Nomads Holding to be liquidated in Kyrgyzstan.” Accessed 2025-09-16. Available at: https://24.kg/english/258185_Heritage_of_Great_Nomads_Holding_to_be_liquidated_in_Kyrgyzstan/;

[15] Economist.kg. “Boston Consulting Group начала разработку стратегии критических минералов для КР.” August 26, 2024. Accessed 2025-09-16. Available at: https://economist.kg/ekonomika/2024/08/26/boston-consulting-group-nachala-razrabotku-stratieghii-kritichieskikh-minieralov-dlia-kr/

[16] Millennial Potash Corp. U.S. Proposes to Add Potash to Critical Minerals List as U.S. DFC Backs Banio Project in Gabon. Vancouver, BC: Millennial Potash Corp., 2025. Available at: https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/millennial-potash-us-proposes-add-potash-critical-minerals-list-us-dfc-backs-banio.

[17] U.S. Geological Survey. The Mineral Industry of Turkmenistan, 2023 [Advance Release]. Reston, VA: U.S. Department of the Interior / U.S. Geological Survey, 2025. Available at: https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2023/myb3-2023-turkmenistan.pdf.

[18] U.S. Department of State, 2024 Investment Climate Statements: Turkmenistan, accessed September 16, 2025, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/turkmenistan.

[19] RFE/RL. “Even Two Decades After Massive Cyanide Spill, Kyrgyzstan’s Kumtor Mine Is Still Unsettled.” Accessed 2025-09-16. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-kumtor-cyanide-spill-compensation-gold-mining/30797137.html

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[20] Reuters. (2021, May 8). Kyrgyz court fines Centerra for placing waste rock on glaciers. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/centerra-gold-kyrgyzstan-idUSL1N2MV07O

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[21] Al Jazeera. (2021, May 14). Kyrgyz leader signs law threatening Kumtor gold mine takeover. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/14/kyrgyzstan-gold-mine

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“Azarga Sells Non-Core Kyzyl Ompul Project” (12 Nov 2019)
Confirms Azarga’s exit terms and the retained 2% royalty structure.
https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/azarga-sells-non-core-kyzyl-ompul-project-2019-11-12

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[30] Ibid.

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[33] Malyukova, N.N. “Rare-Earth Mineralization Distribution by Ore Types at Exploration Horizons of Kutessai-II Deposit.” Research Journal, № 6 (72), 2018, Published 18 Jun 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23670/IRJ.2018.72.6.019. Accessed 2025-09-16.

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